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“The Hardness of the Iconic Must: Can Peirce’s Existential Graphs 
Assist Modal Epistemology?”  
 
1. Introduction: 
I wish to use the role of diagrams in mathematical and logical reasoning to inform a 
broader inquiry into modal epistemology
1
 – specifically examining how we come to know 
necessary truth. Although mathematics is not the only science which involves necessary 
truth, it seems to concentrate on it to an extent that has even been considered defining. 
Thus for instance Benjamin Peirce (father of Charles) began his landmark Linear 
Associative Algebra by claiming that mathematics is “the science that draws necessary 
conclusions” [Peirce, 1870, p. 1]. I wish to defend the following hypothesis: 
Key Hypothesis: Structural articulation is the source of all knowledge of necessity. 
Necessary reasoning is in essence just a recognition that a certain structure has the 
particular structure that it in fact has.  
     If established, this claim will be valuable in dispelling a bafflement often expressed by 
philosophers concerning the objects and ground of our knowledge of necessity. Though 
this bafflement supposedly springs from „naturalism‟, I hope to show that it leads to an 
inability to see certain ubiquitous phenomena which is in essence unscientific. The claim 
as it stands is ambitious and possibly controversial. For instance, the use of the words „in 
fact‟ might suggest that the hypothesis seeks to reduce truth about all possible situations 
to truth in the actual world. This is not my aim. The glory and mystery of necessary 
reasoning is that the structures I will discuss, while experienceable in the actual world, 
somehow manage to gain trans-world significance,
2
 as they must if we are to reason by 
means of them. The „in fact‟ is merely meant to rhetorically invoke a certain moment of 
recognition – in that sense one might say that it is an epistemic rather than a metaphysical 
„in fact‟. To be more precise, I mean that what is recognized has no content over and 
above what is represented by the structure that is already present, but nevertheless 
constitutes some kind of new insight. But more on this below.  
     Consider something we arguably know, which is necessarily true: 
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 To clarify, by „modal epistemology‟ I don‟t mean theories which explicate all knowledge as modal, such 
as epistemic modal logics, e.g. Meyer, J.-J. Ch. (2003). „Modal Epistemic and Doxastic Logic,‟ in: 
Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd edition) (D. Gabbay & F. Guenthner, eds.) Vol. 10, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1-38. Rather I mean how we come to know modal claims.  
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 This use of the phrase „trans-world significance‟ should not be interpreted as necessarily implying a 
commitment to analyzing modality by means of currently popular David Lewis-style discrete and/or 
concrete possible worlds. It is merely meant to convey a more broadly conceived modal realism according 
to which actuality does not exhaust all there „is‟. Peirce although a resolute realist of the latter kind, has a 
different modal semantics, as we shall see. I am grateful to Zach Weber for raising these issues. 
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M1: IF three odd numbers are added together THEN the result will also be an odd 
number. 
How do we manage to know M1? Here I am seeking what might be termed Good Old-
Fashioned Epistemology. A classic example of this might be Hume‟s skeptical 
examination of the idea of substance in Treatise (1, vi). Here Hume claims that every 
idea must derive either from sensation or reflection, the idea of substance cannot derive 
from sensation as it is not seen, heard, smelt or tasted…and cannot derive from reflection 
as, “the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: 
none of which can possibly represent a substance.” Therefore, he concludes, we have no 
knowledge of substance.  
     Can such a structured and systematic story be told about our knowledge of M1? Such 
a project has been traditionally viewed as subject to a major challenge. A classic Hume-
style epistemology gains much of its explanatory power from viewing us as natural 
objects, causally embedded in the world, and our interaction with worldly objects forms a 
large part of the story about how we know them. But in the case of mathematics, what 
objects might we be said to interact with, so that we can reconstruct how our knowledge 
of them might be justified? True mathematical statements such as M1 if taken at face 
value seem to require commitment to a numeric Platonism. And Platonism has been 
rejected as embracing an untenable epistemological mystery. For example Benacerraf 
argues that most “semantics for mathematics” do not “fit an acceptable epistemology”, 
since the former:  
…will depict truth conditions in terms of conditions on objects whose nature, as 
normally conceived, places them beyond the reach of the better understood means of 
human cognition (e.g. sense perception and the like) [Benacerraf, 1973, p. 667]. 
He further explicates “acceptable epistemology” by stating: 
For Hermione to know that the black object she is holding is a truffle…that the black 
object she is holding is a truffle must figure in a suitable way in a causal explanation 
of her belief that the black object she is holding is a truffle [Benacerraf, 1973, p. 
671]. 
The epistemology of modality has been relatively neglected in mainstream analytic 
philosophy (even after considerable attention began to be devoted to the metaphysics of 
modality through the 1970s and 80s), and this arguably has much to do with Hume,
3
 who 
is discussed further in the next section. 
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 Also worthy of note here of course is Quine, e.g. (1947), (1953), who however continues much of Hume‟s 
empiricist tradition. 
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2. Hume and his heirs: the contingency of experience: 
For Hume and empiricism downstream from him, to put it crudely, ordinary middle-sized 
objects are observable, necessity is not: 
I consider, in what objects necessity is commonly suppos‟d to lie; and finding that it 
is always ascrib‟d to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects suppos‟d to be 
plac‟d in that relation…I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and 
place, and that the object we call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one 
instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation 
betwixt these objects. [Treatise, III, xiv] 
Such necessary truths as there are, Hume claims, merely consist in relations between 
ideas. Apart from trivial definitional truths (e.g. “All bachelors are unmarried”) this 
category covers only mathematics. And in fact even here, in remarks little attended to 
today, the early Hume claims skepticism: 
…the ideas which are most essential to geometry, viz. those of equality and 
inequality, of a right line and a plain surface, are far from being exact and 
determinate, according to our common method of conceiving them. Not only we are 
incapable of telling, if the case be in any degree doubtful, when such particular 
figures are equal…but we can form no idea of that proportion, or of these figures, 
which is firm and invariable. Our appeal is still to the weak and fallible judgment, 
which we make from the appearance of the objects, and correct by a compass or 
common measure; and if we join the supposition of any farther correction, „tis of 
such-a-one as is either useless or imaginary…As the ultimate standard of these 
figures is deriv‟d from nothing but the senses and imagination, „tis absurd to talk of 
any perfection beyond what these faculties can judge of…[Treatise, II, iv] 
     Here Hume seems almost to suggest that mathematicians are deluding themselves in 
pretending to pursue an exact science.
4
 He seems to deny the existence of any ideal 
objects, or any real exactitude in mathematical properties and relations, claiming that to 
purport otherwise is “either useless or imaginary”. Although this sort of denouncement 
has been expunged from the Enquiry, it is worth pausing to note the sweeping purity of 
the young Hume‟s empiricist vision. Of course, by this full-fledged assault on our 
knowledge of the necessary, Hume takes himself to abolish much worthless metaphysics, 
a result traditionally much admired. However it is also worth noting how much of this 
exhilarating abolition relies on an epistemological methodology which is unquestioningly 
atomist. It is logically atomist in that all our knowledge is built up (in principle) from 
impressions and the ideas they generate. It also may be described as „socially‟ atomist in 
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 One might counter-claim that Hume hedges his skepticism about the exactitude of mathematics by 
including the qualifier, “according to our common method of conceiving them.” But this suggestion is 
undermined by the seemingly absolute closing claim that, “…the ultimate standard of these figures is 
deriv‟d from nothing but the senses and imagination”.  
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the sense of epistemologically individualist  if one finite mind cannot tell (merely by 
using its senses) whether two particular figures are equal, then there is no answer as to 
whether they are, Hume assumes here. We will have cause to examine the first 
methodological constraint in this paper. (The second would be an interesting topic for a 
future study.) A summary of Hume‟s epistemology of necessity that has been influential 
through recent philosophical history  for instance in Kant‟s response to Hume  albeit 
somewhat sloganistic, is that all necessity is analytic.  
3. Metaphysical necessity rides again 
As noted, in many ways analytic philosophy in its approach to modality is still 
outgrowing the legacy of Hume. Thus Crispin Wright writes, citing Simon Blackburn:  
“We do not understand our own must-detecting faculty.”5 Not only are we aware of 
no bodily mechanism attuned to reality‟s modal aspects, it is unclear how such a 
mechanism could work even in principle. [Wright, 1986, pp. 206-7] 
However in the 20
th
 century it began to appear that in fact not all necessity can be 
reduced to what is „true by definition‟, rather, some is discovered. The now hackneyed 
example is “Water is H2O”. Influential figures such as Kripke and (early mid-) Putnam 
drew on such examples to announce a new category of a posteriori necessity (a.k.a. 
„metaphysical necessity‟). It is worth noting that this form of necessity is described as a 
posteriori as it was scientists who discovered the chemical formula of water. However 
strictly speaking the scientists did not discover that the statement is necessarily true. This 
aspect of the claim is attributed by philosophers, initially by consulting „intuitions‟ about 
an imaginary planet known as Twin Earth.  
     It is worth briefly outlining the background to these developments and the 
understandings of necessity embodied therein, and comparing them with Peirce‟s 
understanding of necessity. An important bridge between Hume and contemporary 
analytic treatments of modality was the „logical empiricism‟ of Carnap. In his 1947  
Meaning and Necessity, Carnap explicated necessity by defining a concept of L-truth 
(logical truth) which consists in those statements which are true in all state descriptions. 
This is to be contrasted with C-truth (contingent truth) which is true only in some state 
descriptions. A state-description is a maximal collection of atomic sentences for a given 
language. For every predicate of that language, P, and every combination of singular 
terms (a, b…) equal to the number of its argument-places, the state description contains 
either Pab[…] or ~Pab[…]. (The conception owes much to Wittgenstein‟s Tractatus.) 
This understanding of necessity is still Humean insofar as Carnap claims that L-truth 
“follows from the semantical rules alone” [Carnap, 1947, p. 1] or in other words, is 
analytically true.
6
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 Here Wright cites [Blackburn, 1986, p. 119].  
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 One might argue that L-truth should not be identified with analyticity for – as Quine pointed out – for a 
language with “extra-logical synonym-pairs”  such as „bachelor‟ and „unmarried man‟ the state description 
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     Shortly afterwards however key developments in formal logic took place. Saul Kripke 
(1959) proved completeness for a model theory for modal logic which replaced state 
descriptions with frames. Each Kripke frame consists in a set of possible worlds W and a 
binary accessibility relation R over them. Mathematical features of possible Rs such as 
symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity neatly explicate different modal systems such as S4 
and S5. Different accessibility relations also allow an elegant division of modality into 
different „flavors‟. For instance physical may be distinguished from logical necessity by 
defining a „nomological accessibility‟ whereby all worlds with the same physical laws as 
a given world are nomologically accessible to it, then claiming that a statement is 
logically necessary if true in all possible worlds, physically necessary if true in all 
nomologically accessible worlds. 
     Crucially, entailment could then be given a new „semantic‟ interpretation according to 
which A entails B iff in all worlds in which A is true, B is true also. This decoupled 
entailment from provability in principle, allowing a greater externalism into modal 
epistemology. One could no longer assume with Carnap that necessary truth “followed 
from the semantical rules alone”, at least as “semantical rules” had previously been 
understood. David Lewis took advantage of this new externalism to give the Kripkean 
logical apparatus what might be referred to as an extreme metaphysical realist 
interpretation, according to which other possible worlds exist in just as concrete a form as 
„ours‟, and actuality is merely indexical [Lewis, 1996]. According to this brand of modal 
realism our irremediable lack of certain knowledge regarding the contents of these 
entirely spatiotemporally disconnected worlds is to be expected and appreciated as a sign 
of mind-independence in the modal subject matter, rather than deprecated.  
     For Peirce by contrast modal metaphysics and epistemology were never sundered in 
this extreme form, although it is important to note that his view developed through his 
career. Robert Lane provides a useful summary of Peirce‟s evolving thinking on 
necessity in [Lane, 2007]. He notes following [Morgan, 1979]
7
 that Peirce began with an 
information-relative account of necessity, according to which a statement is necessary if 
known to be true (and possible if not known not to be true) given a certain state of 
information. This also allows the distinction between modal flavors alluded to above, 
insofar as one can restrict states of information to laws of nature for physical modality, 
current knowledge for epistemic modality, and so on [Lane, 2007, p. 555-6]. Peirce 
gradually became dissatisfied with the information-relative account, however, and his 
reason for this is interesting in the current context. He writes:  
                                                                                                                                                 
method will assign independent truth-values to statements such as “Fred is a bachelor”, and “Fred is an 
unmarried man”. However Carnap did describe the state description method as “an explicatum for what 
Leibniz called necessary truth and Kant analytic truth” [Carnap, 1947, p. 8]. 
7
 See also [Pietarinen, 2006]. 
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It is not that certain things are possible because they are not known not to be true, but 
that they are not known not to be true because they are, more or less clearly, seen to 
be possible. [Peirce, CP, 6.367, 1902] 
His thinking therefore evolved towards an ideal world account, according to which we 
discern modal facts less via inference from a given state of information than via some 
kind of direct perceptual experience of a “world of ideas” which is “but a fragment of the 
ideal world” [Lane, 2007, p. 563]. Peirce writes that with respect to this ideal world we 
are “virtually omniscient”. He envisaged that by inspecting it one might be able to 
determine that a given proposition is impossible although the laws of logic do not show 
that the proposition contains any contradiction.
8
 
4. Imagining vs Imaging: Contemporary Analytic Modal Epistemology 
     To return to contemporary analytic modal epistemology, then, at some point intuitions 
concerning the necessary truth of “Water is H2O” came to appear rather under-theorized. 
Philosophers do not always agree with respect to modal intuitions, particularly where the 
imagined scenarios are quite baroque and odd. Some need was felt for a more principled 
modal epistemology. A pioneer was Stephen Yablo, who drew self-consciously on Hume, 
framing a theory of our knowledge of possibility in terms of conceivability, suggesting 
that in fact this is the only viable route to a modal epistemology.
9
 His key claim is that, 
“A proposition p is conceivable iff one can imagine a world that one takes to verify p” 
[Yablo, 1993, p. 29]. Then a proposition is possibly true if it is conceivable, and 
necessarily true if it is not conceivable that it not be true. 
     What is it to conceive something? Although Yablo pays close attention to 
conceivability‟s functional role, or results, distinguishing between conceivabilitybp (“the 
believability of p is possible”, p. 20), conceivabilityijb (“imagining acquiring evidence 
that justifies you in believing that p”, p. 22), conceivabilityitb (“the imaginability of 
veridically or truly believing that p”, p. 22), conceivabilityep (“…one can 
imagine…believing something true with one‟s actual p-thought”, p. 24), he says little 
about the epistemic mechanism(s) which might produce such results. He does note that 
the imagination will be deeply involved, but suggests that imagining is to be 
distinguished from imaging: 
Some philosophers use “imagine” so that imagining a thing is imaging it, that is, 
conjuring up an appropriate sensory presentation. I do not require a sensory-like 
image for imagining, and certainly not a distinct such image for distinct imaginings. 
(Compare Descartes on the unimaginability of chilliagons…) [Yablo, 1993, p. 27, 
n55] 
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 What Peirce particularly had in mind was a certain proposition in set theory which space does not permit 
discussion of here. For details see [Lane, 2007] and [Morgan 1979, pp. 72-3]. 
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 “If there is a seriously alternative basis for possibility theses, philosophers have not discovered it”, 
[Yablo, 1993, p. 2] 
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     This led Peter Van Inwagen to argue that although Yablo‟s account is probably pretty 
accurate with respect to how we do in fact get modal knowledge, it is question-begging 
for justifying a large number of modal claims beyond well-tried everyday situations –
particularly modal claims made by philosophers. He therefore embraces a modal 
skepticism, of an academic rather than Pyrrhonian variety [Van Inwagen, 1998, p. 69]. In 
support of his position he proffers the example of whether there might be transparent 
iron. He argues that one cannot know whether one can conceive transparent iron unless 
one already knows whether it is possible. Consider for instance a scenario where a 
scientist is pointing to a transparent object and saying, “I am sure that this is iron!” This 
could be a scene which depicts the existence of transparent iron, but it could equally be a 
scene which depicts other possibilities: 
This sort of effort of imagination will…show that a certain proposition has the modal 
status “possible,” but the proposition will be a disjunctive one. Here are some of its 
disjuncts: 
– Transparent iron exists 
– The scientific community has somehow been deceived into thinking that 
transparent iron exists 
– A crackpot physicist who thinks he has created transparent iron is the butt of a 
cruel and very elaborate practical joke... [Van Inwagen, 1998, p. 79] 
This issue of when and how a depiction might guarantee a given epistemic result is most 
intriguing. Van Inwagen does suggest that if one specified enough structural detail one 
might describe a scenario which could only correspond to the possibility of transparent 
iron, but essentially leaves this question hanging, since: 
…although, if we wished to establish the possibility of transparent iron, we should 
have to operate at the same level of imagined detail as condensed-matter physicists, 
we might not be subject to the same constraints as they [Van Inwagen, 1998, p. 80] 
– these constraints being the actual laws of nature. 
     Chalmers follows Yablo with some extra „bells and whistles‟. He distinguishes 
between negative conceivability (“S is not ruled out” [Chalmers, 2002, p. 149]) and 
positive conceivability (“one can form some sort of positive conception of a situation in 
which S is the case” [Chalmers, 2002, p. 150]), favoring the latter as his guide to 
possibility. He claims:  
S is positively conceivable when one can coherently modally imagine a situation that 
verifies S. A situation is coherently imagined when it is possible to fill in arbitrary 
details in the imagined situation such that no contradiction reveals itself. [Chalmers, 
2002, p. 151].  
So far this seems rather reminiscent of Peirce‟s ideal world account of modality. But 
Chalmers also seems to make an effort to avoid understanding imagining as „imaging‟ 
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insofar as he distinguishes between perceptual and modal imagination and notes that 
although imagining that P is more than just “entertaining or supposing that P”, in that it 
has some kind of “mediated objectual character” (p. 150), “[t]his objectual character is 
also present in cases of imagination that are not grounded in imagery” (for instance 
imagining molecules of H2O). He also claims that, “one can imagine pairs of situations 
that are perceptually indistinguishable”, for instance, “the situations postulated by two 
scientific hypotheses that make the same empirical predictions”. In an important sense of 
„perceptual‟ my hypothesis is committed to this claim being false.  
     In order to argue for my key hypothesis I offer not so much a deductive proof as a 
theoretical framework which I will suggest renders key issues properly perspicuous. To 
this end, in the next section I outline Peirce‟s concept of the iconic sign (which is to be 
contrasted with indices and symbols), which enables a semiotic argument, drawing on the 
functional role of different kinds of signs. Then in §6 I offer a further argument for what I 
call “the hardness of the iconic must” which is in essence phenomenological. In §7 I 
inquire into the source or ground of this remarkable feature of our mental landscape, then 
in §8 present Peirce‟s existential graphs as a key technology for revealing and exploring 
it. By this means I derive criteria for distinguishing exactly which aspects of a formalism 
represent necessary truth. Having argued that iconic signs are the only, or „essential‟ 
means of epistemic access to such necessity, in §9 I give a final answer to Humean modal 
epistemology. 
5. Icon, index, symbol 
For Peirce every sign is characterized by a triadic structure which holds irreducibly 
between some signifying item („representamen‟), an object, and an interpretation.10 
Symbols (such as the word “cat”) represent their object via some convention which must 
be learned. This is the kind of sign philosophers, who are traditionally very word-
oriented, have felt most comfortable exploring. However through the 1960s and 70s a 
recognition was forced into mainstream philosophy, e.g. [Perry, 1979], that language also 
includes signs which pick out their object via some direct unmediated relationship (for 
instance a pointing finger, the word “I”). These are known as „indexicals‟ – Peirce called 
them indices.   
     But Peirce considered a third type of sign equally distinct and important. These are 
icons, which pick out their object by possessing the quality signified (e.g. Peirce, 
Collected Papers, henceforth CP, 2.304). Another of Peirce‟s definitions of the icon is 
that its parts should be related in the same way that the objects represented by those parts 
are themselves related. [Peirce, CP, 3.363, 3.641]  Thus icons are the only signs whose 
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 This interpretation does not have to be actual, it can be potential, therein lying a great deal of Peirce‟s 
realism. 
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signification (can) have internal structure.
11
 For an index is just a pointer, and although 
the convention by means of which the symbol symbolizes what it does may have 
structure, that structure will be external to the signification, in the following sense. One 
might for example analyze the convention which connects the word „jade‟ with particular 
sets of stones in particular contexts, distinguishing between, for instance, a Chinese 
convention, a European convention and a New Zealand convention for defining jade. 
However none of these „convention-parts‟ are related in the same way as the parts of the 
sign „jade‟– namely the letters J, A, D and E – are related.  
     Most real-world signs are a mixture of these three sign-types (for instance „I‟ is index 
insofar as it indicates its speaker, and symbol insofar as we have to learn that it is the 
word „I‟ that plays this role). A further three-way distinction holds between (roughly 
speaking) terms, propositions and arguments, which are functionally defined as follows
12
: 
  Term Proposition Argument 
Determines Information to be Conveyed No Yes Yes 
Determines Inferences to be Drawn No No Yes 
As examples of these three, consider as Term: “- is on the mat”, as Proposition: “The cat 
is on the mat”, and as Argument: “The cat is on the mat. If the cat is on the mat, then the 
dog is not in the room. Therefore the dog is not in the room.” 
     Mathematical diagrams, insofar as they depict mathematical structure, are iconic 
signs. Since Peirce claimed that all signs have objects, one might wonder, what is the 
object of, say, a diagram in geometry? Once again, Benacerraf‟s worries about „semantic‟ 
commitment loom. However these may be addressed via Peirce‟s nuanced analysis of 
signification. As the table above reminds us, a term is not yet a proposition. Although 
icons have objects, this does not mean that by using, say, a diagram of a triangle, one is 
thereby making a truth-claim about, for instance, the existence of a triangle (in whatever 
means triangles might exist). In fact one distinguishing mark of the icon compared to the 
other 2 sign-types, Peirce claims, is precisely that it signifies what it does whether or not 
its object exists: 
An icon is a representamen which fulfils the function of a representamen by virtue of 
a character which it possesses in itself, and would possess just the same though its 
object did not exist. Thus, the statue of a centaur is not, it is true, a representamen [of 
a centaur] if there be no such thing as a centaur. Still, if it represents a centaur, it is 
by virtue of its shape; and this shape it will have, just as much, whether there be a 
centaur or not. [Peirce, CP, 5.73, 1903] 
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To interpret a statue of a centaur as a claim that centaurs exist is to add some further 
significance to it. This further significance can only derive from the application of some 
convention that would have to be learned. (Consider that one would have to teach a child 
to regard the statue in such a way.) Peirce generalized from such examples to claim that 
only when icons (and indices for that matter) are embedded in symbols does one get a 
true or false claim.
13
 What would one be doing with signs if not making assertoric 
claims? One might for instance be discerning the necessary consequences of a 
hypothesis, and Peirce suggests mathematics gives a fine illustration of exactly this: 
A geometrical diagram is a good example of an icon. A pure icon can convey no 
positive or factual information; for it affords no assurance that there is any such thing 
in nature. But it is of the utmost value for enabling its interpreter to study what 
would be the character of such an object in case any such did exist. [Peirce, CP, 
4.447, c. 1903] 
     To sum up then, for icons the distinction between representamen and object is closer 
than for indices and symbols. There is at least a partial identity between them, which is 
not the case for the other two sign-types: 
For a pure icon does not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It 
represents whatever it may represent, and whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is an 
affair of suchness only [Peirce, CP, 5.74, 1903]. 
However we will come to see this partial identity as a source of the icon‟s unique role 
and power. I will now outline certain mysteries in necessary reasoning and suggest that 
the iconic sign holds the key to understanding them.  
 
6. The Hardness of the Iconic Must      
Lewis Carroll‟s fable of Achilles and the Tortoise is I believe a brilliant piece of 
rhetorical phenomenology.
14
 It adroitly highlights both the existence and the puzzlement 
of a certain feature of our necessary reasoning – a bindingness on our actions 
(specifically our inferencing) which is a-causal. Although this bindingness does not force 
itself on the reasoner in the way in which a billiard ball makes another ball move, for it is 
not always adhered to in practice (people do reason invalidly), nevertheless it is in some 
sense despite this, intriguingly, still binding. We shall see that the bindingness cannot 
even be explained in a non-question-begging way. Although I have written previously on 
                                                 
13
 Against this one might argue, can‟t a distorted photo of Obama „falsely state‟ that that is how he looks? 
So this would be a false icon? However once again qua picture, a photo just is what it is. To interpret it as 
saying something false about Obama is: i) to peg it to a real-world object (thereby rendering it also an 
index), ii) to claim something general about that object‟s appearance (rendering it also a symbol).  
14
 despite Barry Stroud‟s somewhat astonishing opinion that, “…there is no sound moral to be drawn from 
the story about the nature of validity or logical consequence as such” [Stroud, 1979, p. 179]. 
11 
 
this topic at some length [Legg, 2008], for current purposes I will cover some of the same 
ground.  
     The two mythical racers contemplate Euclid‟s #1 geometric proof: 
(A)  Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other. 
(B)  The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same. 
(Z)  The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other. 
The Tortoise asks Achilles what he would say to someone claiming to accept (A) and (B), 
but not (Z).  Achilles has surprising trouble with this. He devises another conditional to 
express what he sees as manifestly true and missed by the Tortoise: 
(C)  If (A) and (B) are true, (Z) must be true. 
The Tortoise then asks what difference this inscription makes to what he should do with 
respect to inferring (Z)), even if he accepts (A) and (B). Achilles resorts to: 
(D)  If (A) and (B) and (C) are true, (Z) must be true. 
which fails to move the Tortoise to action...and so on towards infinity, with the impasse 
never resolved. 
     It is vital to pay close attention to what is going on here. The dispute is frustrating to 
Achilles and he sees the Tortoise as recalcitrant as his slow companion refuses to be 
bound by a clearly valid argument. One can at this point glimpse an internalism about 
logic, whose analogy to the metaethical notion is no accident, whereby if one is not 
motivated to act by logical norms, it seems that one does not fully understand them.
15
 
Deep issues about normativity emerge at this point. Yet via his recalcitrance the Tortoise 
usefully makes the binding process visible, where it normally escapes attention due to its 
ubiquity. 
     What is now exposed is a structural isomorphism shared by a sign and an act (of 
inference). This might seem a curious idea, but how else might we describe what Achilles 
grasps and the Tortoise does not? We have seen that the disparity between Achilles 
seeing that he must conclude (Z), given (A) and (B), and the Tortoise not seeing this, 
cannot be remedied by any further explanatory signs (as conditionals (C), (D) and so on 
tend to infinity). The fact that further conditional statements are demonstrably useless if 
the Tortoise does not already understand entailment shows that what is seen by Achilles 
and not the Tortoise must be already present, internal to the sign-act pair. The only kind 
of sign which presents such internal structure is the icon. The epistemic must is therefore 
an iconic must. However although the foregoing semiotic analysis gives a reason for this 
claim which consists in eliminating the other two kinds of signs, indices and symbols, 
from consideration, it is important to note that at the end of the day the strongest, most 
convincing argument that icons compel one‟s reasoning is phenomenological. In essence 
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 I am grateful to Neil Sinhababu for discussion on this point.  
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it is an exhortation of the form: “Do logic and mathematics, imagine yourself in Achilles‟ 
position, and you will see what I mean”.  
7. The Ground of the Hardness of the Iconic Must 
But what is the source of such a widespread and useful compulsion? One of the few 
contemporary philosophers to explicitly face this issue is Robert Brandom, who writes, 
“…the most urgent philosophical task is to understand…the bindingness or validity…of 
conceptual norms” [Brandom, 2006, p. 7]. The key, he argues, is a Kantian concept of 
positive freedom, which by contrast to “freedom from some kind of constraint”, is to be 
understood as “freedom to do something.” [Brandom, 2006, p. 12] Such freedom, he 
argues, relies on two apparently opposing forces which in fact work together. Firstly one 
makes individual choices to act. Secondly one surrenders to norms of ethics which 
appraise those acts as right or wrong: 
…autonomy, binding oneself by a norm, rule, or law, has two components, 
corresponding to „autos‟ and „nomos‟. One must bind oneself, but one must also bind 
oneself. If not only that one is bound by a certain norm, but also what that norm 
involves…is up to the one endorsing it, the notion that…a distinction has been put in 
place between what is correct and incorrect according to that norm goes missing. 
[Brandom, 2006, pp. 12-13]. 
Together this paradoxical pair results in a „bonanza‟ of positive freedom – to live in civil 
society and enter into human relationships. In this regard the realm of logic is entirely 
analogous. Firstly one makes individual assertions, and secondly one surrenders to norms 
of logic which appraise those assertions as consistent or inconsistent (or, in the context of 
arguments, valid or invalid). Together these result in a “bonanza of positive expressive 
freedom” – a freedom to say things which would be impossible without such surrender. 
In fact Brandom points out that almost every sentence uttered by an adult native speaker 
is radically novel.  
     However he then attempts a Hegelian reduction of this Kantian picture, claiming that 
“what maintains [the norms of logic] is the attitudes of others…” (p. 16). This appears on 
the face of it to be a form of conventionalism and it is not clear that this is what Kant had 
in mind. For instance Robert Hanna has argued that Kant‟s account of „conceptual norms‟ 
is, when examined carefully, surprisingly externalist: 
…according to Kant the attitude of conviction by its very nature includes a necessary 
truth: „objectively necessary holding-to-be-true, which, if it is at the same time 
subjectively necessary, is conviction‟...So this means that insight both logically 
requires and is partially constituted by something that is non-subjectively or 
objectively real (actually realized in space and time) – something given externally to 
the individual thinker. Put in contemporary terms, and odd as it may initially seem in 
13 
 
view of his commitment to idealism, Kant is most definitely an „externalist‟ about a 
priori belief and knowledge [Hanna, 1998a, p. 117].   
     From a Peircean perspective such conventionalism cannot be correct, since we have 
seen that signs whose meaning is established by convention are in fact symbols. Whereas 
we have established that necessity is signified by the icon. Something is going on in 
iconic signification which is more enigmatic than conventionalism, something for which 
a more direct realism seems appropriate, which arguably is why the spectre of Platonism 
has hovered over mathematics since Plato.
16
 To dispel the spectre we will examine 
Peirce‟s existential graphs as a pragmatist technology for coming to understand the 
reality of the „iconic must‟ without reifying it, rather by using it. In a pragmatist spirit we 
will do this by using the graphs ourselves and observing what happens. In this way I will 
try to show that one achieves a proper understanding of the iconic must by letting it be 
what it is – patterns and real relationships both within signs and between signs and acts – 
rather than, for instance, imagining that signs which signify the „iconic must‟ must 
correspond either to learned patterns of use (i.e. symbols), thereby invoking 
conventionalism, or to pointers to external objects (i.e. indices), thereby invoking a 
metaphysical realism. The familiar and oft-relied upon dichotomy between 
conventionalism and realism is thereby revealed by Peirce‟s original triadic account to be 
false in this case, as it is in many others. 
8. „Diagrammatic Forcing‟: Peirce‟s Existential Graphs 
Peirce wrote: 
[The] purpose of the System of Existential Graphs … [is] to afford a method (1) as 
simple as possible (that is to say, with as small a number of arbitrary conventions as 
possible), for representing propositions (2) as iconically, or diagrammatically and (3) 
as analytically as possible.… [Peirce, CP, §4.561n] 
I will here confine myself to the Alpha Graphs which represent propositional logic.
17
 
Propositions and connectives are there represented as follows: 
 
 A       C                  A               A         C 
 
   A & C                ~A                A  C 
To illustrate what I shall call diagrammatic forcing in Peirce‟s graphs, I will present a 
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 This is not to say that Plato was a Platonist, he was very arguably not. 
17
 As is well-known, Peirce also produced Beta Graphs which are equivalent to first-order predicate logic 
with identity, and began a number of higher-order and modal systems (known collectively as the Gamma 
Graphs) which he never finished.  
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proof of a tautology derived from Peirce‟s Law: (((P  P)  P)  P), and 
compare its invalid close cousin: ((P  P)  P). Here are the rules for the Alpha 
Graphs in the beautifully elegant presentation of Jay Zeman. Note that by „odd‟ and 
„even‟ is meant that a graph is enclosed by an odd or even number of „cuts‟ (negations): 
Proof Rules for Alpha Graphs    [Zeman, 2002] 
 
0.01 Insertion in odd: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
0.02 Erasure in even 
 
 
 
  
 
0.03 and 0.04: Iteration and Deiteration: 
  
 
In the same area: 
 
 
 
  
  
“Crossing Cuts”: 
 
  
 
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0.05 and 0.06: Biclosure 
 
 
 
  
 
The reader is now invited to follow this proof and observe the diagrams and their own 
thinking. The first step in the proof of the tautology is to add a double cut, which is 
permitted anywhere, by 0.05: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then an arbitrary graph can be drawn in the first, oddly enclosed cut, by 0.01: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then this graph can be iterated, one cut inwards, by 0.03:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now another double cut is added, by 0.05 again:   
 
 
 
 
P 
P P 
P P 
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Another new graph is drawn, 3 cuts in, by 0.01:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And that graph is in turn iterated, 4 cuts in (0.03): by 0.01:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
QED. 
 
 
Let us now compare ((P  P)  P). We begin the same way (0.05): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then use 0.01: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
P P P 
P P P P P 
P 
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Then 0.03:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However now we can go no further. What is needed is to establish a P in the second 
enclosure as follows:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One moral of the story of Achilles and the Tortoise is arguably that a “logic diagram” 
includes its rules of use, not just pictures on the page. Upon examining the Existential 
Graph rules we can see that there is no way to establish a P in the second enclosure. The 
space is evenly enclosed, so 0.01 does not apply. And iteration will not work as the space 
is less enclosed than that of the P on the left (whereas iterations can only „cross cuts‟ in 
an inward direction). And the P on the right, though also evenly enclosed, is „sealed off” 
by the other cut. Somewhat fancifully-put, we can see how neither P can „get out of 
where it is‟ to establish P in the middle enclosure. 
     When one aspect of a diagram forces another aspect to be a certain way, it is this that 
enables us to „see‟ necessity. This occurs not by our having epistemic contact with any 
further „modal object‟, but by our fully grasping the relationships amongst the diagram‟s 
different parts. Therein lies the answer to Benacerraf, for we saw him criticize 
mathematics for possessing, “truth conditions in terms of conditions on objects whose 
nature, as normally conceived, places them beyond the reach of the better understood 
means of human cognition”, but here no further objects are presupposed.  
     Of course it is important to note that not all aspects of Peirce‟s diagrams are forced. 
One must learn for instance that letters in the Alpha Graphs correspond to propositions, 
and not to, say, predicate letters applied to an object represented by the larger circle. One 
must learn that the size with which a cut is drawn on the page does not affect its meaning. 
Those aspects of the diagrams are therefore symbolic. However one cannot force the 
construction of ((P  P)  P)in the Alpha Graphs on pain of breaking the structure 
of graphs and rules already present. The more a formalism can force relationships within 
P P 
P P P 
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itself to be the way they are, the more perspicuous the formalism is (in other words, 
bearing in mind our initial definition of the icon, the more its parts are related in the same 
way that the objects represented by those parts are themselves related). This forcedness 
therefore gives us our promised criterion for distinguishing which aspects of a given 
formalism correspond to necessary truth.  
     It should be noted that these arguments are not meant to award the Existential Graphs 
special status with respect to illuminating logical form. Even logic systems such as 
natural deduction force certain results and forbid others, and are thus irreducibly iconic 
also. It is just that such logics contain more arbitrary rules which must be learned. Thus 
the phrase „symbolic logic‟ is a bit of a misnomer, insofar as a symbol, at least as 
understood by Peirce, cannot represent logical form. In Peircean terms the true distinction 
is not between symbolic and iconic but between algebraic and graphical logics, and the 
distinction merely concerns how perspicuous the icons are.
18
 In short, the claim is not that 
Peirce‟s existential graphs convey unique logical insight, merely particularly efficient 
insight.  
9. Conclusion 
Necessity is observable.
19
 One just needs to pay attention, not just to individual things but 
to how those things are related in larger structures. In Peirce‟s words:  
It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand, mathematics is 
purely deductive in its nature, and draws its conclusions apodictically, while on the 
other hand, it presents as rich and apparently unending a series of surprising 
discoveries as any observational science. The truth, however, appears to be that all 
deductive reasoning, even simple syllogism, involves an element of observation; 
namely, deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose 
parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of 
reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the 
result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts. [Peirce, CP, 
§3.363] 
In other words, contrary to what Hume suggested, empiricism doesn‟t prevent one from 
„seeing‟ necessity. Only logical atomism does. Moreover, in answer to Crispin Wright, 
we have a „must-detecting faculty‟ whose workings are clearly open to view when  
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 This explanation is also given in [Legg, 2008, p. 223]. 
19
 It might be argued that, given the point made in the last section that a logic diagram includes its rules of 
use, not just pictures on the page, and that therefore our understanding of the diagram is irremediably 
pragmatic, rather than saying that necessity is observable it would be more accurate to say that it is 
graspable. This is a fine point, but I have elsewhere argued that these are not as different as one might 
think. Because in working with iconic signs the mind is not passive, but active, and (as Wittgenstein put it) 
all seeing is „seeing as‟, in that sense a seeing is a doing [Legg 2008, p. 226]. Sincere thanks to Philip 
Catton for discussions on this.  
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approached with the right logical tools, and observed in use. Reason is not an 
inappropriate name for it.  
     This claim might seem to be in conflict with this paper‟s call to a greater role for 
perception in modal epistemology, particularly within the broader context of Peirce‟s 
move away from an information-relative (and thus inferential) towards an ideal-world 
(and thus experiential) understanding of modality, as sketched in §3. Isn‟t experience the 
opposite of reason? That depends what one means by „reason‟. Contemporary 
understandings of reason seem to see it as almost coextensive with deductive proof 
(possibly overly influenced by recent research in Artificial Intelligence). However an 
older understanding exists in our philosophical tradition whereby it was precisely the 
rationalist philosophers who invoked such notions as „intuition‟ and „clear and distinct 
perception‟. Much more needs to be said however to fully clarify these matters.  
     Along the way careful thought needs to be given to the currently accepted concept of a 
posteriori necessity, apparently exemplified in “Water is H2O”, and how it might relate to 
the examples of necessity in mathematics and logic which are the main focus of this 
paper. In §3 the necessary truth of “Water is H2O” was presented as discovered, as 
opposed to being discerned a priori. But what is it to discover something? If the 
hypothesis of this paper is correct then all discernment of necessary truth involves 
diagrammatic reasoning. It seems possible to give an account of how previously 
uncognized relationships might be „discovered‟ on a diagram, but how this epistemic 
model might be correlated with what chemists who discerned the chemical formula of 
water were doing in the lab is less clear. My current suspicion is that, referring back to 
Peirce‟s triadic distinction of signs into terms, propositions, and arguments outlined in 
§5, necessity properly understood pertains to the argument (the kind of sign which 
determines the inferences to be drawn from it). If this is true then insofar as certain 
propositions are said to be „necessarily true‟, this is because they are in fact serving as 
argument schemas, possibly involving certain other premises which are taken in context 
to be self-evident. If necessity were to be reconceived in this fashion, the necessity of 
many current textbook examples would require redescription, and it is possible that the 
necessity of brute identity statements such as “Water is H2O” would not survive this 
redescription.
20
 But to address these issues in the fullness they deserve would require 
another paper.  
     In the meantime we may conclude that contemporary analytic modal epistemology is 
wrong to disdain „imaging‟ as a guide to modal epistemology. We just need a more 
general concept of what this might consist in. Interdisciplinary investigation with 
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 Such a philosophical move would not be without precedent. For instance, Robert Hanna has made the 
sharply perceptive suggestion that “…what essentialists have mislabelled as „necessary a posteriori‟ 
propositions all belong to Kant‟s class of „impure‟ a priori propositions” [Hanna, 1998a, p. 119]. See also 
his 1998b for an extended and subtle Kantian critique of „scientific‟ essentialism.  
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cognitive science would possibly be illuminating here. Much exciting work in modal 
epistemology remains to be done along these lines.
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